> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://book.bsdcn.org/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://book.bsdcn.org/ask/flat/chapter-20-artificial-intelligence/di-20.3-jie-ren-gong-zhi-neng-zhe-xue-yuan-zhu-xuan-du.md). # 20.3 Selected Readings in AI Philosophy The following are excerpts from philosophical original texts related to this topic. ## An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Hume D. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding\[M]. Lü Daji, trans. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999. ISBN 978-7-100-02618-5. ### Chapter IV, Section I, Paragraph 23 If we want to satisfy ourselves concerning the nature of that evidence which assures us of matters of fact, we must inquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect. I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings **a priori**; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let a man be ever so strong in his natural reason and abilities, if the objects that are presented to him are entirely new, then no matter how carefully he examines their sensible qualities, he cannot discover any cause or effect concerning them. Even if we suppose Adam's rational faculties to be perfect from the start, he could not infer from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him to ashes. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the cause which produced it or the effect which will arise from it. Our reason, without the help of experience, cannot draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact. ### Chapter IV, Section II, Paragraph 28 We have not yet reached any satisfactory answer to the question we first raised. Every answer only gives rise to a new question as difficult as the former, and leads us on to further inquiries. If someone asks: **What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matter of fact?** The proper answer seems to be that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. If asked again: **What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning cause and effect?** It may be answered in one word: "experience." But if we proceed further to ask: **What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?** This implies a new question, which may be more difficult to resolve and explain. ... ### Chapter IV, Section II, Paragraph 29 The following two propositions are far from being the same: > **I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect.** > > **I foresee that other objects which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects.** ### Chapter V, Section I, Paragraph 36 Custom, therefore, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past. Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. All action would immediately cease, and the greater part of speculation would likewise terminate. ### Chapter VII, Section II, Paragraph 60 ... Therefore, from this experience we may properly define a "cause" as: **An object followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.** In other words, if the first object had not existed, the second would never have existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this we also have experience. Therefore, from this experience we may give another definition of cause: **A cause is an object followed by another, whose appearance always leads the thought to the other.** ... For example, we say that the vibration of this string is the cause of this particular sound. But what do we mean by this assertion? We mean either that: **this vibration is followed by this sound, and all similar vibrations are followed by similar sounds; or that this vibration is followed by this sound, and the mind, upon the appearance of the vibration, immediately anticipates the sensation and forms the idea of the sound.** We may examine the relation of cause and effect from either of these two perspectives, but beyond these, we have no idea of causation ## Man a Machine Since all the faculties of the soul depend so much on the organization of the brain and the whole body, it is evident that these faculties are nothing but this very organization itself: what a clever machine! For even if man alone partakes of the laws of nature, is he therefore not a machine? A few more wheels, a few more springs than in the most perfect animals, the brain and the heart proportionally closer together, thus receiving a more abundant supply of blood, and hence reason emerges; is there anything else to it? There are some unknown causes that always produce that delicate, highly vulnerable conscience, that produce the sense of shame, which is no further from matter than thought is from matter — in short, that produce all the differences assumed here. Then is organization sufficient to explain everything? Yes, I say again, organization is sufficient to explain everything. For since thought clearly develops along with the development of the organs, why should the matter that constitutes the organs, once it has acquired the function of sensation over time, not equally be capable of feeling the sentiment of shame? — La Mettrie J. O. Man a Machine\[M]. Gu Shouguan, trans. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2011-7. 54-55. ISBN 978-7-100-07896-2. ## The Turing Test The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the "imitation game." It is played with three people: a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. He labels them X and Y, and at the end of the game says "X is A (man) and Y is B (woman)" or "X is B (woman) and Y is A (man)." The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B thus: C: Will X please tell me the length of his or her hair? Suppose X is actually A (man), then A (man) must answer. It is A's object in the game to try and cause C to make the wrong identification. His answer might therefore be: "My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are about nine inches long." In order that tones of voice may not help the interrogator, the answers should be written, preferably typewritten. The ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter communicating between the two rooms. Alternatively, the question and answers can be repeated by an intermediary. The object of the third player (B, woman) in the game is to help the interrogator. Her best strategy is probably to give truthful answers. She can also add remarks such as "I am the woman, don't listen to him!" but the man can make similar remarks, so this is of no use. We now ask the question: "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A (man) in this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions replace our original question: "Can machines think?" — Turing A. M. Computing Machinery and Intelligence\[J]. Mind, 1950, LIX(236): 433–460. DOI: 10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433. ## The Chinese Room One way to test any theory of mind is to ask yourself what it would be like if my mind actually worked according to the principles that the theory says it does. Let us apply this test to the Schank program with the following thought experiment. Suppose that I am locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese writing. Suppose further (as is indeed the case) that I know no Chinese, either written or spoken, and that I am not even confident that I could recognize Chinese writing as Chinese writing, rather than Japanese writing or meaningless squiggles. To me, Chinese writing is just so many meaningless squiggles. Now suppose further that after this first batch of Chinese writing, I am given a second batch of Chinese material, together with a set of rules for correlating the second batch with the first. The rules are in English, and I understand them as well as any other native English speaker. They enable me to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of formal symbols, where "formal" here means only that I can identify the symbols entirely by their shapes. Now suppose still further that I am given a third batch of Chinese symbols, together with some instructions in English that enable me to correlate elements of this third batch with the first two batches, and that instruct me how to return certain Chinese symbols with certain shapes in response to certain sorts of shapes given in the third batch. Unknown to me, the people who are giving me all of these symbols call the first batch "a script," the second batch "a story," and the third batch "questions." Furthermore, they call the symbols I return "answers to the questions," and the set of English rules they gave me they call "the program." To complicate the scenario further, imagine that these people also give me stories in English, which I understand, and they then ask me questions about those stories in English, to which I reply in English. Suppose that over time I become so proficient at following the instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols, and the programmers become so adept at writing the programs, that from the point of view of an outside observer — that is, someone outside the room in which I am locked — my answers to the Chinese questions are absolutely indistinguishable from those of a native Chinese speaker. Nobody looking at my answers could tell that I did not speak a word of Chinese. Similarly, my answers to the English questions are, as expected, indistinguishable from those of other native English speakers, for the simple reason that I am a native English speaker. From the external observer's point of view, my answers to the Chinese questions and the English questions are equally good. But in the Chinese case, unlike the English case, I produce answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. As far as Chinese is concerned, I function exactly like a computer; I perform computational operations on formally specified elements. For the Chinese questions, I am simply an instantiation of a computer program. — Searle J. R. Minds, brains, and programs\[J]. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1980, 3: 417–457. ## Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein L. Philosophical Investigations\[M]. Lou Wei, trans. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2019. ISBN: 978-7-208-15748-4. ### §7 In the practice of the use of language, one party calls out the word, the other acts in accordance with it. However, in language teaching, it can also happen that the learner names the objects. That is to say: when the teacher points to a type of stone, he utters the word. — Indeed, there may be even simpler exercises: the student repeats a word after the teacher — both are activities akin to speaking. We can also imagine the whole process of using language as one of those games by which children learn their native language. I want to call these games "language-games," and I sometimes also call a primitive language a language-game. Naming a type of stone, repeating some words after someone — these too can be called language-games. Think of some of the uses of words in the game of ring-a-ring-o'-roses. I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities interwoven with it, a "language-game." ### §219 "All the transitions were in fact already completed" means: I have no choice. Once the rule has been stamped with a particular meaning, it traces out the line of compliance throughout the whole space. — But if something really were like that, how would it help me? No, my description only makes sense if understood as something symbolic. — I should say: so it appears to me. When I follow a rule, I do not choose. I follow the rule blindly. ### §359 Could a machine think? — Could it have pain? — Well, should the human body be called such a machine? It certainly comes very close to being such a machine. ### §360 But a machine surely cannot think! — Is that an empirical proposition? No. We only say of a human being, and what is like a human being, that it thinks. We also say it of dolls, and perhaps also of spirits. Think of the word "think" as a tool! ## Rights of Robots Should robots have the same rights as we do? Humans possess intelligence and self-awareness, and therefore enjoy rights. If robots likewise possess these qualities, should they not also enjoy similar rights? These questions are quite complex, but in the near future they will inevitably have practical implications for real-world robots. If robots truly possess self-awareness and demonstrate genuine intelligence, they must be regarded as sentient beings, with their wishes and needs respected, just as human rights are respected. If the rights of these non-human intelligences are not recognized, it would be no different from early Western societies not recognizing the humanity and rights of non-Europeans. Differences in outward appearance must never affect our ethical treatment of self-aware, thinking beings. Yet even today, such situations still exist. There are still people who deny the basic rights of certain peoples — life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. So, could intelligent machines ever have the opportunity to fight for these rights? The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Robots (ASPCR) aims to raise awareness of intelligence, self-awareness, and the associated ethical issues, which are inseparable parts of intelligent life. To this end, ASPCR wishes to propose a "Robotic Bill of Rights" and ultimately establish a lobbying group to promote and protect these rights in society. If you think this is too "science fiction" to be believable, consider the ASPCA (American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). When it was founded in 1866, it was also ridiculed for daring to claim that "stupid" animals also have rights. However, after more than a century of development, the ASPCA has become one of the most influential animal protection organizations in the United States, with an active lobbying team in Washington, an annual budget of hundreds of millions of dollars, and a substantial physical infrastructure (including law enforcement officers and investigators with authority in New York State, who assist prosecutors), ensuring that those who abuse animals cannot go unpunished. As self-aware artificial intelligence gradually becomes reality, the mission of ASPCR will become increasingly important, and it may also ensure that the rights we take for granted apply equally to all intelligent beings, regardless of whether they are "artificially" created. — ASPCR. Robotic Bill of Rights\[EB/OL]. \[2026-05-10]. . American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Robots official website. ## Exercises 1. From what perspectives do the Turing Test and the Chinese Room thought experiment each explore the question of "whether machines can think"? Which perspective do you agree with more, and why? --- # Agent Instructions This documentation is published with GitBook. GitBook is the documentation platform designed so that both humans and AI agents can read, navigate, and reason over technical content effectively. 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